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of Daniel von Wachter, who has argued that the ontology of tendencies may help in ontological engineering. 10 Von Wachter defines a tendency as "a bias in the world at a certain time to carry on in a certain way" (p. 111). His account of tendencies, however, gives rise to the following three problems.
a. Who or what is the bearer of tendencies?
In von Wachter's eyes, it is a state of affairs which is the bearer of a tendency. States of affairs are, in a nutshell, all those complex entities that can be described in that-clauses. Examples are the state of affairs that patient #0004 has red hair or that patient #0012 is slightly green in the face. By ascribing tendencies to complex entities like states of affairs one gains purchase on the circumstances necessary for a certain outcome. Often, over and above the presence of a certain tendency, other necessary conditions have to be fulfilled to trigger the realization process. Such conditions should not be neglected.
But in medicine, tendencies are often ascribed not to states of affairs, but to patients, i.e. to concrete things, independent continuants existing in time and space. It is the patient, not some state of affairs, who has the suicidal tendency or the tendency to bleed. And it is patients, and not states of affairs, who need to be healed. Here I join with those ontologists who distinguish between forces and tendencies: forces are always related to some body they act on, thus they are something relational; tendencies, in contrast, are properties of single concrete things.
According to this picture, forces are not themselves tendencies, but they bring about tendencies in the things they act upon. And why is the tendency important at all, if it is the basis A which causes the event B?
c. Are all monopolised tendencies realized? von Wachter claims that a tendency "will be realized if and only if there is no counteracting tendency" (p. 112). A stone will fall towards 4 the surface of the earth, if and only if nothing holds it back. But this principle is in fact highly problematic. First, the absence of counteracting tendencies is not necessary for a realization.
Imagine a Ferrari being acted upon by three forces that bring about three different tendencies of the car:
This Ferrari has a tendency t 1 to drive forward as a result of the fact that its engine is running;
it has a considerably weaker tendency t 2 to drive forward as a result of the actions of a tail wind; and a third, similarly weak, tendency t 3 not to move forward as a result of air resistance.
Now imagine that the forces that bring about t 2 and t 3 are of equal size. Then t 1 will under these circumstances be realized as if it were the only tendency present, although in fact there is a counteracting tendency t 3 . Thus the absence of counteracting tendencies is not necessary for a tendency to be realized.
Second, the absence of counteracting tendencies is also not sufficient for the realization of a tendency. This can be seen in indeterministic theories like quantum mechanics. An atom has the tendency to decay with a certain probability within a certain time. But because of the probabilistic character of this tendency, even if it were the only tendency present in a given situation, there is no guarantee that it will be realized.
Tendencies in Science
Having used examples from classical physics and quantum mechanics, I should add two remarks on tendencies in different sciences. First, within classical dynamics tendencies are additive as a result of the fact that all tendencies are brought about by forces that are measured by the same physical unit (the Newton), and can be represented as vectors that can easily be added to other vectors. Because of the mathematical properties of vectors, all tendencies combine to yield a single, determinate result. Such a straightforward addition of tendencies is not possible in all cases. Suppose a petunia has the tendency to flourish when placed in a sunny place and the tendency to starve when given too much water; which tendency does it have when placed in a sunny place with a surfeit of water? 12 Or consider human agents, who are acted upon by very different (social, psychological, genetic) forces or influences which normally do not come with any affixed number and unit of measure. This makes it more difficult on the theoretical plane to combine several single tendencies into any single result.
Second, classical dynamics is a deterministic theory. When tendencies have determinate results, our theories can in effect ignore the realm of tendencies and focus exclusively on actual happenings. In this, they differ from indeterministic theories like quantum mechanics and from theories, for example in the humanities, that take into account factors such as free will and spontaneous action. In indeterministic theories, the resultant tendency in no way amounts to a guarantee of one and only one consequent happening: our theories apply always within a realm of probabilities, and we have to wait to find out what will actually happen.
Many tendencies in the medical domain are of this latter kind.
Tendencies and their Realizations

Realizables: A General Structure
Tendencies are properties of a special kind in that they point forward to something-their realization-that they enable or cause or make probable. If a patient has a tendency to bleed, bleeding is the realization of this tendency. Thus the realization is distinct from the tendency itself. While the tendency to bleed is a property of the patient, bleeding is a process or activity. The realization of a tendency is thus not the same as the existence of a tendency.
Tendencies can exist without being realized. A patient can have a tendency to bleed even at a time when he is not bleeding. I will call all properties that share this structure "realizables".
Realizables have the following features: (1) They are properties, and like all properties they are ontologically dependent on their bearer. (2) They are related to other entities-called 6 "realizations"-which they cause, enable or make probable. (3) They can exist independently of their realization.
Different Kinds of Realizables
There is a whole variety of realizables other than tendencies, including dispositions, propensities, abilities, potentialities, and virtues, some of which have a long history in philosophical debates.
a. Dispositions. The major part of the recent philosophical study of dispositions 13 has centred on 'sure-fire' dispositions, i.e. on dispositions that invariably lead to a certain result given certain circumstances. Thus, an ascription of a disposition is usually of the form "x has the disposition D to become R given circumstances C", as for example in:
(D1) Sugar has the disposition to dissolve when placed in water.
(D2) This glass has the disposition to break when thrown on the floor.
It is often said that dispositions are "occult powers" because one can never "observe" a disposition itself but only its realization. In fact, however, a disposition ascription of the above form entails a test procedure for any given disposition D: Put x in circumstances C and watch whether x becomes R. 14 b. Propensities. While 'sure-fire' dispositions are dispositions that invariably lead to a certain result given certain circumstances, propensities do so only with a certain probability. 15 They are therefore sometimes also called 'probabilistic dispositions'. we often mean not only the ability to do something simpliciter but also the ability to do that something well.
d. Potentiality. The term 'potentiality' 17 dates back to the early Latin translators of Aristotle, who used potentia and actus as translations of the Greek dynamis and energeia, respectively, terms which had already a multi-facetted use in the original Aristotelian texts, 18 and which have subsequently acquired an even broader variety of meanings. Here I will discuss only one conception of potentiality-as nth-order disposition-in order to contrast it with the other kinds of realizables presented here.
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A disposition D, we said, leads to a realization R in certain circumstances. Now, what if R is itself a disposition, say a disposition to become R*? Then D is a disposition to acquire another disposition, and one might say that D is the second-order disposition to become R*,
i.e. the disposition to acquire a disposition to become R*. A patient may not have the disposition to be healed by a complicated operation because he is too weak to survive such a surgical intervention. But he may have the disposition to strengthen his constitution to the point where he may undergo the operation at a later time. Thus, although he does not have the disposition to be healed by an operation of this type, he does have the second-order disposition-the potentiality-to be healed in this way. Of course, dispositions of third or higher order are also conceivable. Having the potentiality for R, or so I want to stipulate, is to have an nth-order disposition for R, for some n. 
How tendencies relate to the other kinds of realizables
To be sure, words like "disposition" and "tendency" have a wide range of associated meanings in both ordinary and scientific discourse. Sometimes they can be used interchangeably, as in: "Radium-226 has the tendency or disposition to decay with a half-life of 1602 years". At other times the words clearly have different meanings; just compare "the tendency of a speech" with "the disposition of a speech" (where the words have meanings which are not even touched on in this paper). In the preceding sections, I used these terms to denote different sub-categories of realizables. How, now, do tendencies relate to those subcatgories of realizables discussed above?
First, there is an obvious difference between sure-fire dispositions and tendencies along the dimension of reliability. To use Champlin's example: "If you knew you had to make a parachute jump from a plane and, perusing the parachute maker's operating instructions on the eve of your jump, your eyes lit on the words, 'Your parachute has a tendency to open when the rip-cord is pulled', wouldn't you feel at least a faint whiff of apprehension?" 20 What we aim for is a parachute that invariably opens when the rip-cord is pulled, i.e. a parachute that has a sure-fire disposition to this effect (even if we know that some real-world parachutes lack such a property). Thus, in contradistinction to sure-fire dispositions, tendencies are realizables that do not invariably realize themselves in appropriate circumstances.
A natural way to account for the lack of invariant realization is to identify tendencies with probabilistic dispositions. And some tendencies can indeed be treated in this way, and thus as distinct from sure-fire dispositions. The tendency of a collection of Radium-226 atoms to reduce to half their number within 1602 years could be regarded as such a probabilistic disposition, and this is the reason why in the mentioned context "disposition" and "tendency"
can indeed be used interchangeably. But not all tendencies can adequately be described in these terms. The tendencies of classical dynamics, as we saw, are not always realized, even when they are 'active'; this, however, has nothing to do with probability or chance, but rather with the presence of competing tendencies.
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The difference between tendencies and sure-fire dispositions is also made clear through the difference in our reaction to the non-realization in appropriate circumstances. We cannot at once uphold the thesis that some x is both in circumstances C and has a sure-fire disposition to R in circumstances C, but does not display R. In such a case we may either reject one of these beliefs about x, C or R, or revise our belief about what is to count as the actual set of relevant realization-conditions C. When faced with an analogous situation involving a tendency ascription (like "x has a tendency to R in circumstances C") there is no need for a belief revision of this kind.
Nor are tendencies sure-fire dispositions of a higher order, for nth-order sure-fire dispositions are realized with the same degree of reliability as one-step sure-fire dispositions, even if their realization stretched out among several stages. But, of course, there may be tendencies of higher order, i.e. tendencies to acquire tendencies. There may also be mixed higher-order forms, for example a sure-fire disposition to acquire a tendency, or a tendency to acquire a sure-fire disposition.
Tendencies differ from abilities, too. For a tendency, in order to be realized, normally requires nothing like a decision or act of free will. On the contrary, some philosophers think that there is a tension between describing people as following tendencies and describing them as free rational agents. 21 In fact, our decisions may block the realization of, say, certain bad tendencies we have. It might be the case, however, that people have tendencies to decide in certain ways. The virtuous person, for example, has the tendency to decide in favour of virtuous actions. Thus, virtues are a certain kind of tendencies: they are, as Aristotle pointed out, tendencies governing decisions and involving tendencies for emotions. 22 All this shows that tendencies form a sub-category of realizables in their own right, next to other sub-categories like sure-fire dispositions. Here, we argued only for the distinctness of these sub-categories. We did not argue for the thesis that corresponding instances exist in the real world, though we did consider various candidate examples. It may, however, be an ontological possibility that the world should contain, for example, no sure-fire dispositions at all, but only tendencies, just as it is an ontological possibility that the world were to contain no virtues at all.
After this discussion, we are able to suggest a place for tendencies within a taxonomy of properties: Tendencies are realizable qualities with realizations that do not depend on decisions. We can illustrate this with the following taxonomic tree:
Tendency Ascriptions
Tendency Types and Tendency Tokens
Like virtually all entities, tendencies come in types on the one hand and tokens or instances on the other hand. Thus some tendency ascriptions are ascriptions of tendency tokens, while others are ascriptions of tendency types. Tendency tokens are ascribed to individual substances, e.g. to persons, as in: "Patient #0002 has a tendency to vomit", "Patient #0829 tends to get sunburn quickly" or "Patient #1203 suffers from ecdysiasm". 23 "The red haired have the tendency to get sunburn quickly", on the other hand, is an ascription of a tendency type to another type, in this case the type being-red-haired. Other examples are:
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• "The central regions of the protein show tendencies to form beta-bends."
• "Thought-action fusion is associated with tendencies towards obsessive-compulsive disorder." • "Male self-cutters showed 'multi-impulsive bulimic' tendencies".
• "Male delinquent adolescent were found to have greater tendencies towards antisocial personality, sociability, being sexually abused, and alcohol and drug use."
As tendencies are causal properties, it is not surprising that such tendency ascriptions go along with causal assumptions. If a correlation between two kinds of entities is discovered, the first entity can be either the cause or the effect of the other entity, or both can be effects of a common cause. Being a delinquent adolescent is an effect of being sexually abused, while supplementation of FOS is the cause of an increase of faecal nitrogen excretion. Still other correlated kinds of entities are effects of a common cause-and maybe being a male selfcutter and showing multi-impulsive bulimic tendencies is an example of this type.
The Standard Square of Tendency Ascription
The examples given in the preceding section reflect the statistical methods used in modern The entities represented in statements like (S1) and (S2) are of course not unrelated to each other. Individuals like x in (S2) instantiate universals like U in (S1), and tendency tokens like t in (S2) instantiate tendency types like T in (S1):
(S4) t instance-of T Putting (S1) to (S4) together, we get a square-shaped scheme. I will call it the "standard square of tendency ascription" or, simply, the "standard square", because it represents the typical case in which statements of all these four kinds are involved:
The relation between an individual like x or t and a universal like U or T need not be one-toone. Individuals instantiate a multitude of universals, and a tendency instance t may instantiate various types of tendencies.
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The correlation we deal with in biomedical sciences are normally statistical results of empirical studies, many of them in laboratories. One and the same statistical result of a biomedical experiment can, of course, fit to totally different scenarios on the ontological level. Suppose that we observe 100 instances of a given universal U in situation S, but that in only fifty cases does R happen, i.e. in only 50 % of all cases is the realizable itself realized.
There are several ontological scenarios that would explain this result. Here are two of them:
(A) Every instance of U has a tendency t to R in S where t has a probability of realization 0.5.
(B) Every second instance of U has a sure-fire disposition to R in S; the other instances of U do not have any disposition or tendency to R in S.
Both of these scenarios would explain the given observations. To distinguish between them we need to refer to tendency tokens (or disposition tokens) of individuals. It should be clear that it is vital for biomedical science to be able to draw this distinction. In case (A) the U make up a uniform population, where in case (B) they form two sub-populations with quite distinct features. This is one good reason to reserve a place for tendency tokens in our ontology.
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Which treatment a medical practitioner will suggest may crucially depend on the scenario he takes to be the actual one. Which scenario we choose for our account of the observation will, in turn, depend on other observations and causal assumptions. If for example we knew that nearly always the same instances of U display R and nearly always the same instances of U do not display R, this would prima facie count as a reason to embrace (B). Thus if it is always the same patients who complain about migraine attacks after drinking red wine, then this would be evidence for ascribing a corresponding tendency to these patients individually.
If, on the other hand, we know that the same instances of U sometimes do display R and sometimes do not display R, this would prima facie count as a reason to embrace (A) and thus to inquire into further background conditions pertaining to the U's, for example pertaining to the stability of the causal properties in question: how they can be stable over time, how (if at all) they can be acquired, and how they (if at all) can be lost. A genetic predisposition, for example, is quite stable during the lifetime of an individual, but may vary significantly across the members of a whole population. Exposure to different environmental influences, however, can even vary considerably during the lifetime of a single individual, not to mention the differences for different instances of the same universal in different geographical locations or social circumstances.
Two Deviant Cases
The reason why I called the square "standard" is that it represents the standard case of tendency ascription, i.e. the case in which all four components of the square are really present.
But there are also non-standard cases. Rom Harré distinguishes between two such cases:
tendencies "ascribed to a being just in so far as that being is a member of a class of such beings and so can be expected to share a common nature with its fellows" and "tendencies ascribed because of some unique and idiosyncratic configuration of its components". 27 I will discuss Harré's two cases in order. 
Mere Correlations
The upper side of the square, or so I said, represents a statistical finding. Thus there may be plenty of instances of U that do not have any associated instance of the universal T. If x is such an instance, only the following torso of the standard square remains:
This is the first of two ways in which the ascription of a tendency may fall short of the standard case. It is important to bear this possibility in mind.
Contingent Individual Tendency
The other deviant case that Harré is hinting at is not so obvious, and I will argue that there are no examples for it. This second case corresponds to the following deviant square:
Is it a metaphysical possibility that a tendency token t could be sui generis? Is it conceivable that we have a case where there is a t instantiating some tendency universal T, but no U instantiated by x that is correlated with T? Having a tendency may come about through a combination of rare properties or events such that there is only one individual having this tendency. Someone might acquire a certain tendency, say, after abduction by aliens. However, even if only one person underwent this special treatment, one is inclined to assume that 15 anybody who eventually undergoes the same treatment would acquire a tendency token of the same type. Thus there actually is a universal U that is causally connected to the tendency in question, even if it happens that it has only one actual instantiation.
If the tendency in question happens to come into existence by some combination of several universals instantiated by the same individual, we should look for a conjunctive combination of these universals to fill the gap in the upper left corner of the square. There is, however, a dispute whether conjunctions of universals (like Object_that_is_green_and_round) name universals in their own right.
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But even if we reject conjunctive universals we may fill the gap, if we replace U by a plurality of universals U 1 , U 2 , …, U n , and add a new relation "conjunctively-correlated-with".
Then we get something like the following:
Thus even in this case there is a way to fill the gap, though it might be considered ontologically questionable to admit conjunctive properties or too ad hoc to substitute the relation "correlated with" with "conjunctively correlated with". Filling the gap in the alienabduction example, however, was neither ad hoc nor ontologically questionable. But, of course, such examples never bother the medical researcher, because correlations of universals that have only one instantiation can simply not be discovered by statistical means. Nor are such correlations useful to develop medical therapies that are meant to fit a wide range of patients.
Epistemic Variants
The previous discussion had a twofold conclusion. First, there are reasons to doubt the existence of contingent individual tendencies. One reason for this is our deeply rooted belief 16 in regularities in nature of the sort which are expressed in scientific laws. Second, in cases of the type discussed, the level of universals would be of no interest for the medical sciences because the universals in question would be instantiated by one individual only.
What will, however, be the case in the medical realm is that the square of tendency ascription will remain gappy because of a lack of knowledge about the tendencies in question.
Such an epistemically gappy square can again come in two variants. First, we can start with the bottom line and get a gap in the upper left edge:
E.g., a patient may see the doctor and report that he has a tendency to vomit. It is the doctor's task to discover the universal instantiated by x that is correlated to the corresponding type of tendency in order to design a therapy for this patient. In many cases, it will more precisely be some part of x that instantiates a universal that is correlated with T's being instantiated by the whole organism of x. This mereological aspect deserves closer attention, but I will not discuss this issue here.
Second, a doctor may observe that a patient instantiates a certain universal U, and he may know that U is correlated with a certain tendency type T. From this, the doctor may assume with a certain probability that the patient himself possesses a token of this tendency. But as the correlation between U and T is only a statistical one, it admits of exceptions. Thus, the following situation is possible:
The doctor knows, first, that x instantiates U and, second, that U is correlated with tendency type T. But this is not enough to conclude that x possesses a tendency token t that instantiates T because, by assumption, the correlation between U and T is statistical only, and thus comes with exceptions. That is, not all instantiations of U possess tokens of T. The proper diagnosis in this situation is accordingly not:
(DA) x has a tendency t, but rather something like:
(DB) Patient x instantiates a universal U that is correlated with a certain tendency type T.
Therefore, there is a certain probability P that x possesses a token t, instantiating T.
This sounds a bit clumsy and so it might be helpful to illustrate the difference between (DA) and (DB) with the help of an example. It is the difference between having a tendency and having the chance of having a tendency: The probability of my developing the symptoms of Huntington Disease (HD) is very small when measured against all humans on earth. The probability for the offspring of a patient with this genetic disorder to develop HD later in life is much larger: The HD gene defect is transmitted with a probability of 0.5 to a member of the next generation. But only those who actually have the HD defect have a tendency to develop the symptoms, while those without the HD defect have no tendency to develop the symptoms whatsoever. Now, while the diagnostician does not have any information about the genes of a child (but only of the HD parent), his diagnosis must be of the (DB) form. But once the diagnostician learns that a child has the HD defect itself, the diagnosis must be of the (DA) form.
Conclusions
The ontology of tendencies, or so I have argued, is of vital importance for the representation of medical reality. For an appropriate representation of tendencies we need to be able to distinguish tendencies from other kinds of realizables. While tendencies share some features with other properties of the realizable-realization-structure such as dispositions, abilities, potentialities, virtues and so forth, they differ from these in a number of salient respects. For the diagnostician, ascriptions of both tendency tokens and tendency types are relevant, and they are connected to each other in a characteristic way that I modelled as the standard square of tendency ascription. In the standard case, ascriptions of tendency tokens go hand in hand with the correlation of a corresponding tendency type with another universal. As tendencies are causal properties, we will need causal background knowledge to represent tendencies appropriately, and any representation of tendencies will be a representation of possible causal relations For this, we need to know more about causal reasoning and we need new formal tools to relate realizables to their realizations. But these matters are already beyond the scope of the present paper.
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